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During  his  first  term  in  office,  President  Clinton  noted  that  America 
faced  three  deficits:  a  federal  budget  deficit,  an  education  deficit,  and  an 
infrastructure  deficit.  Although  the  budget  deficit  will  be  eliminated  by 
2001,  it  is  still  prominent  in  the  minds  of  many  policymakers,  thereby 
reducing  the  ability  of  public  policy  to  remedy  the  other  two  deficits. 
The  continuing  preoccupation  with  the  budget  deficit  has  led  to  a 
search  for  alternative  ways  of  financing  education  and  infrastructure  pro- 
grams  and  providing  incentives  to  direct  spending  to  those  areas.  Special 
tax-deferred  and  tax-free  savings  plans  have  been  devised  for  higher  edu- 
cation,  but  as  yet  no  plan  has  been  proposed  for  the  financing  of  infra- 
structure  projects. 
In  this  brief,  S  Jay  Levy  and  Walter  M.  Cadette  introduce  a  means  by 
which  the  federal  government,  in  conjunction  with  state  and  local  gov- 
emments,  might  finance  infmstructure  projects  without  overly  adding  to 
the  budget  deficit.  Their  prop04  GIHS  for  the  establishment  of  an  insti- 
tution  within  the  Federal  Reserve  that  would  purchase  interest-free 
mortgage  loans  from  state  and  local  governments  for  infrastructure  pro- 
jects.  Such  loans  would  cut  the  total  cost  of  the  projects  about  in  half. 
The  only  addition  to  spending  in  the  federal  budget  would  be  in  the 
form  of  forgone  interest  on  Treasury  securities  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
would  no  longer  receive  because  it  would  hold  the  mortgages  in  place  of 
the  securities.  And,  as  Levy  and  Cadette  note,  infrastructure  investment 
can  stimulate  and’even  raise  the  growth  path  of  the  economy  to  a  new, 
higher  level,  a  factor  not  taken  into  account  in  their  budget  estimates. 
The  jerome  Lay  Economics  hstitute  of  Bard  College  7 Owwoming  ArnerSs  Znfrusrructunz  Deficit 
The  present  federal  budget  surpluses  would  appear  to  make  this  a  perfect 
time  for  implementing  a  program  not  only  to  increase  spending  on  infra- 
structure  projects  but  to  raise  the  growth  path  of  the  economy.  Levy  and 
Cadette’s  proposal  would  accomplish  both  goals.  We  hope  that  their 
paper  stimulates  debate  over  the  future  direction  of  budget  policy. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadiminiou 
Exeative  Director 
May  1998 
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I A  Fiscally  Responsible  Plan  for 
Public  Capital  Investment 
Citizens  chronically  complain  about  dilapidated  school  buildings, 
condemned  highway  bridges,  contaminated  water  supplies,  and  other 
shortcomings  of  the  public  infrastructure.  In  addition  to  causing 
inconvenience  and  endangering  healthF  the  inadequacy  of  the  public 
infrastructure  has  been  found  to  adversely  affect  productivity  and  the 
growth  of  the  economy.  Public  investment,  private  investment,  and 
growth  are  intimately  linked  (Erenburg  1994;  Aschauer  1993). 
Poor  maintenance  gets  some  of  the  blame  for  the  sorry  state  of  the 
nation’s  infrastructure.  States  and  localities  receive  federal  aid  for 
building  highways,  but  have  little  political  incentive  for  maintaining 
them.  State  and  local  government5  own  89  percent  of  the  public,  non- 
defense  fixed  capital  (Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  1997,  37)  and  pay 
for  most  of  the  maintenance  of  these  facilities  by  taxing  their  residents. 
The  voters  may  not  notice  if  a  bridge  is  not  painted,  but  they  do  feel  the 
pain  of  taxes.  When  the  bridge,  because  of  neglect,  is  condemned,  its 
replacement  may  be  paid  for  by  the  federal  government  and  often  is.  The 
officials  at  the  ribbon-cutting  usually  are  eager  for  the  media  attention 
attending  such  ceremonies  (Regan  1994;  Environmental  Working  Group 
and  Surface  Transportation  Policy  Project  1997). 
Another  source  of  the  infrastructure  deficit  is  the  federal  government’s 
method  of  accounting.  An  unfair  fiscal  burden  is  imposed  on  taxpayers 
by  the  federal  government’s  practice  of  expensing  capital  projects  as  they 
are  built  as  if  they  were  consumed  immediately.  Americans,  most  of 
whom  own  their  own  homes,  understand  the  wisdom  of  paying  for  a 
structure  over  its  useful  life. 
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step  toward  overcoming  its  infrastructure  deficit  and  in  doing  so  promote 
the  productivity  needed  to  meet  the  competitive  challenges  that  may 
arise  from  China,  an  economically  unified  Europe,  or  elsewhere  in  the 
world.  The  plan  is  fiscally  sound.  It  follows  the  best  accounting  practices 
of  the  private  sector,  and  it  is  designed  to  recognize  the  statutes  that 
mandate  a  balanced  federal  budget.  In  salient  ways,  it  advances  sound 
fiscal  opemtion. 
The  plan  would  provide  $50  billion  a  year  for  zero-interest  mortgage 
loans  to  state  and  local  governments  for  capital  investment  in  types  of 
projects  specified  by  Congress  and  the  president.  Being  zero-interest,  the 
loans  would  cut  the  overall  cost  of  projects  about  in  half  (depending  on 
prevaihng  interest  rates)  for  state  and  local  governments.  The  principal 
of  the  loans  would  be  repaid  in  annual  installments.  No  mortgage  would 
be  for  a  period  of  more  than  30  years,  and  the  period  of  repayment  would 
depend  on  the  type  of  project.  A  loan  to  build  a  new  sewerage  disposal 
plant  might  be  for  30  years,  but  one  to  rehabilitate  a  dilapidated  school 
building  might  have  to  be  repaid  in  10  years  or  less.  To  protect  the  tax- 
payers’  investment  in  these  projects,  the  loans  would  have  covenants 
requiring  regular,  effective  maintenance. 
The  subsidizing  of  capital  projects  in  the  form  of  zero-interest  loans 
would  be  a  cost  to  the  federal  government.  However,  at  small  annual 
cost,  it  would  achieve  large  and  badly  needed  improvements  in  the 
nation’s  infrastructure. 
In  this  brief  we  discuss  the  link  between  public  investment  and  eco- 
nomic  performance,  the  structure  of  a  plan  to  finance  public  capital 
investment,  the  need  for  the  federal  government  to  support  such  a  plan, 
and  the  implications  of  the  plan  for  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  We  find 
that  the  money  created  by  the  loan  process  would  result  in  a  corre- 
sponding  increase  in  real  assets,  and  the  money  would  be  withdrawn 
from  circulation  as  the  assets  were  depreciated  and  the  mortgages  repaid. 
Because  this  investment  program  would  raise  the  economy’s  long-term 
growth  rate,  it  would  be  partly,  perhaps  entirely,  self-financing.’  In  short, 
a  national  commitment  to  public  capital  can  be  undertaken  in  a  fiscally 
prudent  way.  Indeed,  failure  to  make  such  a  commitment  would  irre- 
sponsibly  circumscribe  the  American  economy’s  future. 
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Figure  1  Nondefense  Public  Investment  as  Percentage  of  GDP 
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Public  Capital  Investment  and  Economic  Growth 
As  shown  in  Figure  1,  from  1955  through  1980  total  nondefense  public 
investment  averaged  3.0  percent  of  GDP;  from  1981  through  1997  it 
averaged  only  2.3  percent  and  was  below  2.3  percent  in  the  most  recent 
four  years.  A  reduction  in  federal  government  investment  contributed  to 
the  overall  decline,  but  much  less  than  reductions  by  state  and  local  gov- 
ernments,  which  typically  account  for  about  85  percent  of  such  invest- 
ment.  Burdened  by  rising  taxation,  state  and  local  taxpayers  frequently 
were  reluctant  to  approve  bond  issues  to  finance  infrastructure. 
Widespread  neglect  of  maintenance  aggravated  the  decline  in  the  capital 
stock.  As  shown  in  Figure  2,  net  of  depreciation,  the  real  nondefense 
public  capital  stock  rose  between  1977  and  1997  at  a  pace  only  half  that 
set  between  1955  and  1977. 
Evidence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  public  capital  stock  is  seen  in  such 
problems  as  unsafe  bridges,  urban  decay,  dilapidated  and  overcrowded 
schools,  and  inadequate  airports.  A  General  Accounting  Office  study 
found  that  education  is  seriously  handicapped  by  deteriorating  school 
buildings  and  that  an  investment  of  $110  billion  is  needed  to  bring  them 
up  to  minimally  acceptable  condition  (General  Accounting  Office 
1995).  The  absence  of  up-to-date  public  facilities  in  good  condition 
takes  a  toll  in  less  visible  and  perhaps  even  more  important  ways  by 
The  Jerome  thy  Economics  Znstitute  of  Bard  College  11 Overcoming  America’s  infrastructure  Deficit 
Figure 2  Nondefense  Public  Capital  Stock  (Constant  Dollar,  Net  of 
Depreciation,  Year-over-Year  Percent  Change) 
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impeding  private  sector  productivity  and  thereby  diminishing  the  real 
income  growth  of  the  nation.  Seemingly  endless  traffic  jams,  disruptions 
to  commuter  rail  service,  and  backed-up  airport  runways-everyday 
experiences  for  Americans-spell  waste  and  inefficiency  for  the 
economy  at  large.  Congestion  on  the  nation’s  highways  alone  costs 
the  nation  an  estimated  $100  billion  a  year,  according  to  the 
Competitiveness  Policy  Council  (1993).  And  that  estimate  does  not 
include  the  costs  of  added  pollution  and  wear  and  tear  on  vehicles. 
Research  has  highlighted  the  link  between  investment  in  public  capital 
and  the  performance  of  the  economy  at  large  (Aschauer  1989,  1997~; 
Munnell  1990)  and  has  shown  that  public  and  private  investments  are 
complements-public  capital  investment  stimulates  private  investment 
(Erenburg  1993,1994).*  Every  CEO  h  h  w  o  as  made  a  decision  to  locate  a 
factory  near  an  interstate  highway  junction,  a  research  laboratory  in  a 
community  with  good  schools,  or  a  corporate  headquarters  conveniently 
close  to  an  airport  can  testify  to  the  role  that  public  infrastructure  plays 
in  influencing  private  investment. 
“Infrastructure  Dollars  Pay  Big  Dividends”  was  the  headline  of  a  Wull 
Street  J4  article  (August  12,  1997)  that  said  that  “more  and  more 
state  and  local  economic  development  agencies  are  recognizing  that 
12  Public  Policy  Brief unless  they  are  prepared  to  invest  in  more  infrastructure  spending,  they 
will  be  left  behind  in  the  jobs  race.”  The  article  cites  the  Wadley- 
Donovan  Group  of  Morristown,  N.J.:  “If  an  area  does  not  have  infra- 
structure  in  place,  including  basic  roads,  sewers,  telecommunications 
capability,  and  transporpdtion,  it  will  not  even  be  considered  by  the  vast 
majority  of  companies.”  It  also  quotes  Alicia  Munnell,  a  former  member 
of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers:  “The  debate  over  whether 
spending  on  airports,  roads  and  the  like  is  unproductive  has  been  settled. 
It’s  just  silly  to  say  it  doesn’t  pay  off,” 
Fazzari  (1993)  has  examined  and  found  false  the  notion  that  public 
investment  leads  to  a  reduction  in  private  investment;  the  process  typi- 
tally  is  one  of  “crowding  in,”  not  “crowding  out.”  Research  by  Aschauer 
(1997~)  indicates  that  business  fixed  investment  from  the  late  1960s 
through  the  late  1980s  would  have  been  0.6  of  a  percentage  point  higher 
as  a  share  of  GDP  had  the  nation  dedicated  an  additional  1  .O  percentage 
point  of  GDP  to  public  investment. 
Even  if  the  effect  on  the  economy  of  maintaining  the  1955  to  1980  rate 
of  increase  in  public  investment  were  no  more  than  half  as  large  as  the 
research  indicates,  the  nation’s  wealth  and  income  would  now  be  about 
one-fifth  higher  than  it  is.  According  to  Aschauer  (1997a),  economic 
growth  is  stimulated  until  the  public  capital  stock  reaches  an  estimated 
62  percent  of  the  v&e  of  business  plant  and  equipment.  Recent  data 
indicate  that  the  nation  has  far  to  go  to  achieve  that  optimal  balance 
between  public  and  private  capital.  Some  states  are  close  to  the 
optimum,  but  the  nationwide  average  value  of  the  public  capital  stock  is 
only  45  percent  of  the  value  of  business  plant  and  equipment. 
Why  a  Federal  Role 
Unfortunately,  for  fiscal  and  other  reasons,  state  and  local  governments  have 
been  unable  to  provide  sufficient  investment  in  infi-astructure  to  come  even 
close  to  providing  an  optimal  public  capital  stock.  Because  Washington’s 
support  is  needed  to  supplement  state  and  local  efforts,  the  plan  described 
here  is  for  a  partnership  between  the  federal  and  state  and  local  govem- 
ments.  At  least  four  circumstances  warrant  such  a  partnership. 
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The  infrastructure  deficit  has  become  a  critical  national  problem. 
Federal  mandates  for  a  range  of  activities,  from  limiting  pollution  to 
caring  for  the  poor,  frequently  strain  the  budgets  of  spate  and  local 
governments  and  of  their  taxpayers. 
Providing  roads,  schools,  and  other  public  capital  benefits  all  Americans. 
They  gain  from  a  first-class  interstate  highway  system,  a  well-educated 
workforce,  and  air  and  water  reasonably  free  of  pollutants. 
Federal  subsidies  have  traditionally  been  called  upon  to  “even  things 
out”  across  states  and  regions  when  widely  disparate  income  levels 
and  exposure  to  natural  disaster  have  been  deemed  to  impose 
inequitable  burdens.  State  governments  play  a  similar  role  within 
their  own  boundaries. 
A  $50  billion  a  year  program  to  increase  srate  and  local  government 
infrastructure  investment  would  return  public  capital  spending  to  the 
standards  of  the  period  from  1955  to  1980.  If  the  zero-interest  infrastruc- 
ture  mortgages  were  amortized  over  a  period  of  IO  years-that  is,  if  10 
percenr  of  the  debt  were  repaid  annually-the  total  outstanding  debt 
would  level  off  at  $300  billion  after  10  years  and  the  interest  subsidy  at 
about  $15  billion  (based  on  early  1998  interest  rates).  A  payback  period 
as  short  as  10  years  would  be  inappropriate  if  most  of  the  investments 
were  in  new  bridges,  highways,  and  other  long-lived  assets.  However, 
Congress  might  well  decide  that  the  program  should  begin  with  the 
rehabilitation  of  existing  infrastructure. 
The  federal  government  would  not  be  making  unsound  loans  in  the 
sense  that  it  would  not  be  running  the  risk  that  the  debtors  will  default. 
Defaults  on  municipal  bonds  are  rare.  During  the  period  1992  to  1996 
defaults  averaged  less  than  one-eighth  of  one  percent  of  the  outstanding 
debt  (Bond  Investors  Association  1997).’  Generally,  state  and  local  juris- 
dictions  are  required  to  get  their  voters’  approval  before  they  can  borrow 
to  finance  public  improvements,  and  such  approval  would  still  be 
required.  Although  the  interest  cost  would  be  subsidized  by  the  federal 
government,  state  and  local  government  taxpayers  would  be  responsible 
for  repaying  the  principal. 
Investing  $50  billion  annually  in  an  $8  trillion  economy  may  not  seem 
like  a  huge  sum,  but,  be  it  private  or  public,  investment  has  considerable 
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leverage  on  overall  economic  activity  (Samuelson  1976,228  ff,).  To  pro- 
mote  stability  and  steady  growth,  adjustment.  in  the  $50  billion  annual 
infrastructure  investment  would  be  warranted.  During  periods  of  expan- 
sion,  especially  when  concerns  about  inflation  increase,  a  smaller 
amount  could  be  made  available,  while  during  periods  of  sluggish  growth 
or  recession  the  amount  could  be  increased.  The  object  would  be  to 
strike  an  annual  average  of  $50  billion  over  the  period  in  which  the  plan 
was  in  place. 
Implementing  the  Plan 
The  plan  contemplates  the  establishment-  of  a  Federal  Bank  for 
Infrastructure  Modernization  (FBIM),  which  would  buy  and  hold  the  eli. 
gible  state  and  local  government  mortgages  using  credit  supplied  by  the 
Federal  Reserve.  The  FBIM’s  balance  sheet  would  have  t_he  zero-interest 
state  and  local  government  mortgages  on  the  asset  side  and  the  similarly 
zero-interest  “deposits”  of  the  Federal  Resetve  on  the  liability  side. 
The  FBIM’s  purchases  of  the  mortgages  would  be  integrated  into  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  open  market  operations.  Through  such  purchases 
the  Federal  Reserve  would  be  providing  a  source  of  liquidity  to  the 
economy  at  large.  These  purchases  would  displace  in  most  circum- 
stances  the  purchases  of  Treasury  securities,  customarily  used  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  provide  reserves  to  the  banking  system: 
The  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  would  have  the 
authority  to  vary  the  size  of  any  given  year’s  financing  under  the  plan.  It 
would  determine  whether  the  FBIM  should  be  accepting  mortgages  at 
the  rate  of  $50  billion  per  year  or  at  some  other  rate  within  a  range  to  be 
stipulated  in  the  legislation. 
The  FBIM  would  be  the  day-to-day  administrator  of  the  plan,  but  would 
have  no  scope  in  project  selection.  It  would  take  mortgages  on  projects 
of  types  specified  by  statute  and  consistent  with  the  provisions  of  the 
legislation  for  equitable  regional  distribution  of  the  financing. 
Administrative  costs  (including  the  cost  of  any  defaults)  would  be  COW 
ered  by  a  small  fee  charged  to  the  borrower.  The  fee  would  be  less  than 
one-half  of  one  percent  of  the  amount  financed. 
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The  FBIM  need  not  be  built  from  the  ground  up.  Indeed,  its  functions 
could  be  grafted  onto  either  of  two  existing  institutions:  the  Treasury 
Department’s  Federal  Financing  Bank,  which  extends  loans  to  federal 
agencies  that  at  one  time  borrowed  in  their  own  names,  or  the  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  System,  which  as  central  banker  to  the  nation’s  thrift 
institutions  is  attuned  to  local  needs. 
lmplicatioqs  for  Monetary  Policy 
The  Federal  Reserve  ordinarily  supports  the  economy’s  growth  by  purs 
chasing  Treasury  securities  as  a  means  of  adding  reserves  and  currency  to 
the  system.  At  the  end  of  1997  the  Federal  Reserve  held  $432  billion  of 
government  obligations  (Federal  Reserve  Board  1997).  If  the  economy,  as 
measured  by  nominal  GDP,  were  growing  at  an  annual  rate  of  5  percent 
and  the  Federal  Reserve  increased  its  holdings  of  Treasuries  by  approxi- 
mately  the  same  percentage,  their  holdings  would  rise  by  just  over  $20 
billion  per  year,  given  recent  levels  of  Federal  Reserve  holdings.5 
The  FEW’s  purchases  of  the  subsidized  mortgages  would  take  the  place  of 
the  central  bank’s  purchases  of  Treasury  securities.  To  prevent  the  cre- 
ation  of  excessive  reserves,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  open  market  desk  would 
likely  become  a  net  seller  of  Treasuries.  As  the  FEYM  was  buying  $50  biL 
lion  of  state  and  local  government  mortgages,  the  open  market  desk 
would  be  selling,  say,  $30  billion  of  Treasuries.  On  balance,  the  character 
of  monetary  policy  would  not  be  changed  in  any  way.  Just  as  now,  pohcy- 
makers  would  strive  to  strike  the  right  balance  between  ovetall  credit  cre- 
ation  and  credit  restraint  for  any  given  background  set  of  cyclical 
conditions.  The  Federal  Reserve  would  still  hold  ample  stocks  of  Treasury 
securities  to  be  sold  if  it  were  intent  on  draining  reserves.  The  Federal 
Reserve’s  implicit  interest  rate  targets  need  not  be  affected  in  any  way. 
Given  the  size  of  the  Treasury  market  ($3.5  trillion  of  marketable  securi- 
ties  outstanding),  the  Federal  Reserve’s  sales  of  Treasuries  to  the  extent 
envisaged  are  unlikely  to  have  much,  if  any,  impact  on  Treasury  yields 
relative  to  the  yields  on  other  securities.  As  for  interest  rates  generally, 
the  impact  of  a  program  to  subsidize  state  and  local  government  mart- 
gages  would  depend  on  the  economy  at  large.  In  periods  of  economic 
slack,  with  loan  demand  down  and  banks  rushing  into  the  Treasury 
16  Public  Policy  Brief market  to  put  their  deposits  to  work,  it  would  be  comparatively  easy  to 
finance  an  added  $50  billion  of  state  and  local  government  obligations 
(less  than  1  percent  of  GDP)  and  to  find  private  buyers  for  the  Treasury 
securities  that  the  Federal  Reserve  would  not  as  a  result  hold  in  its  port- 
folio.  In  those  circumstances,  the  Federal  Reserve  would  find  a  ready 
market  for  the  l?easuries  it  was  selling.  Market  interest  rates  would  rise 
barely,  if  at  all,  as  a  result  of  the  added  demand  for  goods  and  services 
arising  from  the  states  and  localities.  That  would  not  be  the  case  if  the 
economy  were  operating  close  to  capacity  and  the  policy  objective  was 
to  curb  inflationary  pressures.  In  that  instance,  market  interest  rates 
might  have  to  rise  in  order  to  finance,  without  inflationary  conse- 
quences,  the  added  demand  for  goods  and  services.  But  the  plan  does 
anticipate  reduction  in  the  level  of  infrastructure  funding  at  times  of 
cyclical  strength. 
Strengthening  Monetary  Policy 
Integrating  into  monetary  policy  what  is  in  essence  a  fiscal  function-fed- 
eral  support  for  state  and  local  government  investment-would  strengthen 
the  Federal  Reserve’s  ability  to  foster  steady,  noninflationary  economic 
growth.  A  closer  link  would  be  forged  between  the  money  stock  and  the 
nation’s  real  wealth  because  money  would  be  created  to  produce  real 
assets.  The  money  stock,  in  turn,  would  be  withdrawn  as  the  assets  depre- 
ciated.  Money  that  represents  undepreciated  capital  assets  is  sound  money. 
To  the  extent  that  stepped-up  growth  of  the  public  capital  stock  succeeded 
in  raising  the  economy’s  potential  growth,  the  Federal  Reserve  could  aim 
to  achieve  faster  growth  of  the  money  stock.  The  Federal  Reserve,  more- 
over,  would  be  more  effective  both  in  cooling  an  economy  that  threatened 
to  overheat  and  in  spurring  economic  activity  that  faltered. 
When  stimulus  to  economic  activity  is  called  for,  the  Federal  Reserve 
could  give  investment  and  thus  the  economy  at  large  a  direct  boost  by 
directing  the  FBIM  to  increase  its  purchases  of  infrastructure  mortgages. 
Such  a  move  would  usually  be  more  effective  than  lowering  interest 
rates  and  waiting  for  lower  borrowing  costs  to  affect  demand.  Even 
when  not  having  to  “push  on  a  string,”  the  Federal  Reserve  has  had  to 
contend  with  the  long  and  variable  lags  that  have  made  traditional 
policy  levers  problematic.  Indeed,  the  efficacy  of  monetary  policy  has 
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become  increasingly  questionable  in  recent  years  because  of  financial 
innovations.  Especially  important  are  the  shift  from  reservable  deposits 
to  nonreservable  liquid  balances  at  mutual  funds  and  other  institutions 
and  the  enormous  and  rapid  cross-border  movement  of  funds. 
When  excessive  demand  and  inflation  threaten,  the  Federal  Reserve  has 
had  to  consider  the  possibly  serious  adverse  effects  of  raising  the  Federal 
funds  rate  on  bond  and  stock  markets  at  home  and  abroad,  Derivatives 
and  their  use  by  leveraged  investors  such  as  hedge  funds  have  increased 
the  vulnerability  of  markets  to  increases  in  interest  rates.  These  institu- 
tions  react  almost  instantaneously  when  a  rise  in  short-term  interest 
rates  cuts  into  the  spread  on  their  long  positions-in  marked  contrast  to 
an  earlier,  simpler  age  when  long-term  investors  tended  to  stick  by  their 
long  positions  as  short  rates  rose.  Indeed,  by  overtly  raising  interest  rates, 
the  FederaI  Reserve  could  well  precipitate  serious  market  disturbances. 
The  change  to  a  mote  speculative  bond  market-and,  with  it,  to  a  mote 
speculative  currency  market-naturally  has  made  the  Federal  Reserve 
mote  cautious  in  tightening  than  in  the  past.  Indeed,  policymakers  now 
signal  moves  toward  higher  interest  tates  and  announce  changes  in 
policy  as  soon  as  the  decisions  are  made. 
The  turmoil  in  Asian  financial  markets  at  the  turn  of  the  yeat,  which 
echoed  in  U.S.  markets,  occurred  as  the  U.S.  unemployment  rate  was 
headed  to  an  unusually  low  4.5  petcent,  as  reported  shortages  of  skilled 
workers  were  becoming  widespt-cad,  and  as  wage  raises  generally  were 
accelerating.  The  Federal  Reserve  was  almost  certainly  weighing  the 
need  for  a  rise  in  short-term  rates  to  remper  the  economy’s  inflationary 
potential  against  the  possibly  destructive  effects  of  such  a  move  on  secu- 
rities  and  currency  markets  worldwide.  Under  the  program  described 
here,  the  Federal  Reserve  could  reduce  the  FBIM’s  purchase  of  state  and 
local  government  mortgages;  it  could  moderate  an  economic  expansion 
without  overtly  raising  interest  rates  and  thereby  precipitating  possibly 
quite  latge  changes  in  stock  and  bond  prices. 
Implications  for  the  Budget 
Under  the  proposed  plan,  the  profits  of  the  Fedeta  Reserve,  which 
come  from  the  interest  income  it  receives  on  its  securities  holdings, 
18  Public  Policy  Brief would  decline.  And,  since  Federal  Reserve  profits  are  turned  over  to 
the  Treasury,  federal  receipts  would  decline  commensurately.  The  effect 
of  this  loss  of  revenue  on  the  federal  budget  would  be  quite  small,  how- 
ever.  As  a  rough  guide,  the  Federal  Reserve  would  receive  about 
$2.5  billion  less  in  interest  than  it  otherwise  would  during  the  first 
year  of  the  plan’s  operation  (in  this  case,  the  FBIM  would  own  some 
$50  billion  of  state  and  local  government  bonds,  which  would  bear  no 
interest,  instead  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  owning  a  like  amount  of 
interest-bearing  Treasuries).  When  the  program  had  fully  matured  and 
$300  billion  of  mortgages  were  outstanding,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  (and, 
in  turn,  the  Treasury’s)  loss  of  interest  receipts  would  be  in  the  neigh- 
borhood  of  $15  billion  a  year.  This  estimate  is  static,  however;  it 
should  also  take  into  account  the  salutary  effect  on  long-term  growth 
and  thus  on  federal  revenue  apt  to  come  from  a  higher  private  as  well 
as  public  capital  stock. 
An  alternative  means  of  financing  new  infrastructure  would  have  pri- 
vate  investors  buy  the  bonds  and  the  federal  government  reimburse  the 
issuing  state  and  local  governments  for  the  interest  expense.  That 
approach,  however,  would  seriously  compromise  the  national  objective 
of  budget  balance.  The  commitment  to  pay  the  interest  subsidy  would 
impose  a  budgetary  obligation  on  the  federal  government  for  the  life  of 
the  security.  And  it  would  therefore  trigger  budget  rules  that  would 
measure  the  cost  of  the  interest  subsidy  in  present-value  terms  over  that 
life  and  score  that  cost  against  the  current  year’s  budget.  Under  the 
rules  of  the  Federal  Credit  Reform  Act  of  1990  (which  took  effect  in 
fiscal  year  1992),  the  long-run  cost  would  have  to  be  recognized  ini- 
tially,  in  contrast  to  the  pre-1992  practice  of  recording  expenditures  on 
a  cash  basis. 
That  approach,  moreover,  would  not  convey  the  advantages  of  financing 
via  an  FBIM:  enhanced  efficacy  of  monetary  policy  in  keeping  the 
economy  on  a  stable,  noninflationary  growth  path  and  an  explicit  link 
between  the  money  stock  and  the  nation’s  real  wealth.  Indeed,  with 
budget  surpluses  on  the  horizon  for  the  first  time  in  decades,  open 
market  operations  may  well  have  to  branch  out  beyond  Treasuries  to 
provide  for  a  growing  economy’s  liquidity  needs.  Surpluses,  moreover, 
would  offer  a  unique  opportunity  to  reverse  the  pattern  of  crimped 
public  investment  that  large  deficits  naturally  gave  rise  to. 
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Bridges  that  have  been  condemned,  school  buildings  in  such  disrepair 
that  learning  is  jeopardized,  facilities  that  provide  water  with  uncomfort- 
ably  high  levels  of  contaminants,  and  many  other  infrastructure  short- 
comings  threaten  American  growth  and  prosperity.  Moreover,  the 
growth  of  population,  advances  in  technology,  and  the  longterm  eco- 
nomic  progress  of  nations  that  compete  in  world  markets  with  U.S.  firms 
call  for  strong  efforts  to  enhance  productivity.  The  proposed  program  to 
improve  infrastructure,  even  though  limited,  is  a  means  to  ensure  the 
nation’s  economic  future.  It  enables  the  federal  government  to  play  a 
vital  role  in  bringing  needed  improvements  about  without  impairing  its 
fiscal  goals  and  its  commitment  to  control  inflation.  Keeping  the 
promise  of  the  future  requires  that  the  United  States  make  provision  for 
the  basics  for  economic  growth. 
Notes 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The  decrease  in  the  money  supply  that  would  occur  as  assets  are  depreciated 
would  result  in  a  smaller  decline  in  GDP  than  the  initial  boost  that  would 
occur  with  the  increase  in  the  money  supply.  Moreover,  since  the  initial 
boost  would  raise  the  long-term  growth  path  of  the  economy,  GDP  would 
still  be  higher  after  depreciation  than  without  the  initial  increase  in  assets. 
Erenburg  (1994,  14-16)  also  includes  a  good  summary  of  the  research. 
The  association  states  that  some  defaults  may  not  result  in  losses  to  the 
bondholders. 
These  mortgages  would  not,  of  course,  serve  the  exact  function  of  Treasury 
securities  as  they  would  have  to  be  held  by  the  Federal  Reserve  until  the 
securities  matured  and  could  not  be  sold  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  drain 
reserves  from  the  system. 
Because  the  Federal  Reserve  returns  most  of  the  interest  it  receives  to  the 
Treasury,  the  federal  government  is  in  effect  printing  money  without  the 
restraint  of  an  interest  burden  that  might  discourage  borrowing  or  encourage 
repayment  of  debt.  Moreover,  this  money  is  likely  to  pay  for  such  ephemeral 
intangibles  as  interest,  welfare,  and  subsidies.  But  the  money  hardly  has  an 
ephemeral  presence;  judging  by  the  record,  the  debt  that  created  this  money 
is  highly  unlikely  to  be  repaid.  The  debt  bought  by  the  FBIM  would  represent 
real  wealth,  such  tangible  assets  as  restored  school  buildings  and  new  air- 
ports.  Moreover,  this  debt  would  be  repaid  as  the  buildings,  airports,  and 
other  assets  depreciated. A  Fiscully  Responsible  Pknr  for Public  C@tu~  Investment 
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